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BREAKING THE BARRIERS OF ACCESS TO HEALTH
CARE: A DISCUSSION OF THE ROLE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGATION AND THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN BURDENS OF PROOF AND THE
EXPERIENCE OF DENIAL
Marianne L. Engelman Lado*
INTRODUCTION
The delivery of health care in the United States is multi-
tiered; the greatest levels of security and many of the benefits
of medical research and advanced technology are reserved for
selected segments of American society. Structural forms of
racial discrimination and practices of segregation by providers
of medical services are common and entrenched, and they
ensure that such security and benefits are not available to
many African Americans and most of the poor. Part I of this
Article will focus on the need to ensure protection against
racial discrimination in the delivery of health care. Part II will
discuss the role of civil rights litigation in addressing barriers
of access. Finally, Part III will turn to a key problem faced by
civil rights litigators in the courts today-the gulf between the
realities of exclusion that are experienced by our clients and
what is accepted as proof of exclusion by courts. Unfortunately,
advocates can expect this problem to survive even a dramatic
overhaul of the health care regime. This Article suggests that
to be more successful on behalf of our clients, we need to find
more effective and creative ways of communicating the experi-
ence of denial.
* Staff Attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.
("LDF"). Portions of this paper are based on NAACP Legal Defense & Educational
Fund, Inc., Inequity in the Distribution of Health Care: Closing the Gap (1992), a
report that I authored in 1992 as a staff attorney at the LDF. My appreciation
goes both to LDF for the opportunity to work on issues of access to health care,
and to Alice Brown, John Charles Boger, Ronald L. Ellis, Jane Perkins and
William King, all of whom assisted with the development of the report.
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I. BARRIERS OF ACCESS TO CARE
Despite the development of state and federal medical care
programs over the past three decades,1 as well as tremendous
efforts by health care professionals working under adverse
conditions in clinics and other health care facilities in low-
income communities, health status remains largely dependent
upon race and income. Indeed, from conception onward, Afri-
can Americans, particularly the poor, are exposed to greater
health risks than are whites,' and are more likely to contract
preventable illness,' to suffer from chronic and often disabling
1 See, e.g., Subchapter XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395
(1988 & Supp. III 1991) (Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled); Subchapter
XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (Grants
to States for Medical Assistance Programs).
2 See generally Wornic L. Reed et al., The Health and Medical Care of Afri-
can-Americans, in ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 5 (1992)
(discussing risks related to infant mortality, cancer incidence, homicide, lead poi-
soning, chemical dependency and AIDS). See also COMMITTEE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE,
Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE
RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITES (1987); ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, LEGACY OF LEAD: AMERICA'S
CONTINUING EPIDEMIC OF CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING 24 (1990) (reporting that
almost 70% of inner-city children are estimated to be contaminated by detrimental
levels of lead); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 133 (113th ed. 1993) (Table 200) (Children
Immunized Against Specific Diseases, by Age Group: 1985 and 1991) (reporting
that African American and other non-white children were less likely to have re-
ceived diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis, polio, measles, or Hemophilus B vaccinations at
two-years old and at one- to four-years old than were white children of the same
age) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
3 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ("HHS"), HEALTH STATUS OF
MINORITIES AND LOW-INCOME GROUPS (3d ed. 1991) [hereinafter HEALTH STATUS];
HHS, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON BLACK & MINORITY HEALTH
(1985) [hereinafter SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE]; Reed et al., supra note 2; see also
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP.,
May 1993, at 11 (Table 8) (reporting AIDS cases by race/ethnicity); AMA Council
on Ethical & Judicial Aft., Black-White Disparities in Health Care, 263 JAMA 2344
(1990) [hereinafter Black-White Disparities]; Lance B. Becker et al., Racial Differ-
ences in the Incidence of Cardiac Arrest and Subsequent Survival, 329 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 600 (1993) (finding the incidence of cardiac arrest significantly higher for
blacks than whites in every age group); Pat Braus, Heart Disease, AM. DEMO-
GRAPHICS 32, 34 (1990) (African Americans have higher rates of heart disease); Zev
Harel, Older Americans Act Related Homebound Aged: What Difference Does Racial
Background Make?, 9 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 133 (1986) (compared with
their white counterparts, the black aged are more impaired in health and func-
tional status).
Although the discussion presented here reports primarily on the health status
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conditions such as diabetes,4 hypertension,5 and cancer,6 and
to die prematurely.7 Consider the following:
* African American infants are more than twice as likely
and experiences of low-income African Americans, since this is the focus of the
author's work, civil rights advocates who are working to address barriers of access
in the provision of health care have strong opportunities for coalition building
across ethnic lines. In particular, inequities in the distribution of health care ser-
vices and health hazards also fall with greater weight on other low-income people
of color. Relatively high rates of disease incidence and premature mortality, and
low levels of medical treatment are also experienced by other racial and ethnic
minorities. See generally SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra; Council on Sci. Aff.,
Hispanic Health in the United States, 265 JAMA 248 (1991); Antonio L. Estrada et
al., Health Care Utilization Barriers Among Mexican Americans: Evidence from
HHANES 1982-1984, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 27 (1990); Eli Ginzberg, Access to
Health Care for Hispanics, 265 JAMA 238 (1991); Sylvia Guendelman & Joan
Schwalbe, Medical Care Utilization by Hispanic Children: How Does It Differ from
Black and White Peers?, 24 MED. CARE 925 (1986); Julia M. Solis et al., Accul-
turation, Access to Care, and Use of Preventive Services by Hispanics: Findings
from HHANES 1982-1984, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 11 (1990); Fernando M. Trevino
et al., Health Insurance Coverage and Utilization of Health Services by Mexican
Americans, Mainland Puerto Ricans, and Cuban Americans, 265 JAMA 233 (1991).
4 SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 150; Kenneth G. Manton et al.,
Health Differentials Between Blacks and Whites: Recent Trends in Mortality and
Morbidity, in HEALTH POLICIES AND BLACK AMERICANS 169-71 (1989); see also STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 94 (Table 129) (Death Rates by Selected
Causes and Age, 1970-1990); HEALTH STATUS, supra note 3, at 134 (Figure 1) (con-
taining the mortality rate differential).
5 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1985 121 (111th ed. 1991) (Table 196) (Persons
With Activity Limitation, by Selected Chronic Conditions); HEALTH STATUS, supra
note 3, at 149; SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 110; Manton, supra
note 4, at 169-70.
r NATIONAL CANCER INST., CANCER AMONG BLACKS AND OTHER MINORITIES:
STATISTICAL PROFILES (1986) (Pub. No. 86-2785) (among the major racial and eth-
nic groups represented in the United States, African Americans have the highest
incidence for all cancers combined, the highest overall cancer mortality rates and,
along with Native Americans, the least favorable overall survival rates); see also
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 94 (Table 129) (Death Rates, by Selected
Causes and Age: 1970 to 1990); SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 89, 91;
Reed et al., supra note 2, at 33-41.
While whites showed increased survival rates during the 1970s, African Amer-
icans experienced a largely unchanged survival pattern. Moreover, racial disparities
in survival rates were independent of the time of diagnosis, i.e., disparate survival
rates were experienced for both early and late diagnoses. NATIONAL CANCER INST.,
supra, at 6; see also, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 138 (Table 211)
(Cancer-Estimated New Cases, 1992, and Survival Rates, 1974-76 to 1983-88).
7 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 85 (Table 116) (Selected Life Table
Values: 1969 to 1990); SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 89, 91 (the Afri-
can American population experiences 60,000 "excess deaths" annually); Reed et al.,
supra note 2, at 5, 9-12.
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as white infants to die before reaching their first birth-
day;8
* African American women are three times more likely to
die in childbirth than white women;9
* The life expectancy for African American men is eight
years shorter than for white men; and
* African American women have a life expectancy nearly
six years shorter than white women."
As these examples illustrate, in the United States race is a
crucial factor in determining not only health status, but even
length of life.
There can be no doubt that the disparity in health status
reflects, in part, the widespread continuation of discriminatory
and segregatory practices in the provision of medical servic-
es." Diagnosis and treatment often are biased by race and
8 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 89 (Table 121) (Infant, Maternal,
and Neonatal Mortality Rates, and Fetal Mortality Ratios, by Race: 1970-1990).
See generally HHS, 6 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON BLACK & MI-
NORITY HEALTH: INFANT MORTALITY 16-20, 56 (1986); Reed et al., supra note 2, at
17-21.
9 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 89 (Table 121) (Infant, Maternal,
and Neonatal Mortality Rates, and Fetal Mortality Ratios, by Race: 1970-1990)
(reporting a maternal mortality rate in 1990 of 22.4 for African Americans and 5.4
for whites); see also W. Joseph May & Frank C. Greiss, Jr., Maternal Mortality in
North Carolina: A Forty-Year Experience, 161 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
555 (1989); Reed et al., supra note 2, at 22; Carla J. Syverson et al., Pregnancy-
Related Mortality in New York City, 1980 to 1984: Causes of Death and Associated
Risk Factors, 164 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 603 (1991).
10 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 86 (Table 115) (Expectation of Life
at Birth, 1970 to 1991, and Projections, 1995 to 2010) & (Table 117) (Expectation
of Life and Expected Deaths, by Race, Sex and Age: 1990).
" For greater detail on discriminatory practices in the provision of medical
services, see, e.g., Black-White Disparities, supra note 3, at 2345-46; Sandra
Blakeslee, Poor and Black Patients Slighted, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
1994, at B6 (reporting on two studies appearing in JAMA that found racial dispar-
ities in the delivery of care in hospitals); Sheana W. Funkhouser & Debra K.
Moser, Is Health Care Racist?, 12 ADV. NURS. SCI. 47 (1990); David L. Wood et
al., Access to Medical Care for Children and Adolescents in the United States, 86
PEDIATRICS 666 (1990) (survey research results show that poor, uninsured or non-
white children less frequently have a regular source of care, more frequently use
emergency rooms, community clinics and hospital outpatient departments as their
regular providers, and more frequently encounter financial barriers to health care;
moreover, independent of insurance or health status, low-income, nonwhite children
have much less access to care than their higher-income, white counterparts); John
Yergan et al., Relationship Between Patient Race and Intensity of Hospital Services,
25 MED. CARE 592 (1987); see also Mary Benedict et al., Racial Difference in
Health Care -Utilization Among Children in Foster Care, 11 CHILDREN & YOUTH
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class. For example, studies have shown that older black men
on Medicare receive heart bypass surgery about one-fourth as
often as similarly situated whites. The gap is widest in the
Southeast, where whites are more than six times more likely
to have the surgery as blacks. 2 African Americans with kid-
ney failure are less likely to receive long-term dialysis or kid-
ney transplants. 3
Segregation, racial discrimination and practices of exclu-
sion have characterized the provision of medical care in the
United States from its inception. As historian Rosemary
Stevens writes, throughout the twentieth century "[h]ospitals,
as social institutions, carried (and enhanced) prevailing as-
sumptions about social class and racial divisions in the United
States."'4 African Americans in need of medical care were
denied services entirely, or were placed in segregated wards
that provided inferior care in the least desirable facilities. 5
Federal policy sanctioned segregation in federally assisted and
federally administered facilities."
SERV. REV. 285 (1989); Phyllis Solomon, Racial Factors in Mental Health Service
Utilization, 11 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHAB. J. 3 (1988); Frederick D. Wolinsky et al.,
Ethnic Differences in the Demand for Physician and Hospital Utilization Among
Older Adults in Major American Cities: Conspicuous Evidence of Considerable In-
equalities, 67 MILBANK Q. 412 (1989).
12 Fewer Heart Bypasses for Blacks on Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1992, at
B6; see also Black-White Disparities, supra note 3, at 2344-45; Braus, supra note
3, at 34 (African Americans are less likely to have coronary bypass and coronary
angiography operations despite higher rates of heart disease); Mark B. Wanneker
& Arnold M. Epstein, Racial Inequalities in the Use of Procedures for Patients with
Ischemic Heart Disease in Massachusetts, 261 JAMA 253 (1989).
"3 Black-White Disparities, supra note 3, at 2355; see also Spencer Rich, Study:
Blacks Wait Longer for Kidney Transplants, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1990, at A16.
14 ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH: AMERICAN HOSPITALS IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 50 (1989).
1 Id. Stevens describes, for example, the availability of hospital care in the
1920s:
Pay beds for black Americans were largely nonexistent, and where they
existed, in all-black hospitals, services were often poor and sometimes
dangerous. Almost a quarter of all general hospitals in the United States
in 1922 reported that they limited their services to hites....
Id. at 137. See also the description of racial distinctions between and within hospi-
tals throughout the twentieth century. Id. at 9-10, 112-13, 174, 252-54, 312; W.
Montague Cobb, Medical Care and the Plight of the Negro, 54 CRISIS 201, 208-20
(1947); Funkhouser & Moser, supra note 11, at 48-49 (on relationship between
history of racial conflict and health care access).
16 For a discussion of inequality by race and class in Veterans Administration
hospitals, see Stevens, supra note 14 at 127, 222, 386 n.49. Segregation in and
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In I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings, Maya Angelou
writes of her experience as a child in need of health care. 7
Her grandmother tried aspirin and home remedies to cure the
author's toothache, and Maya Angelou tried prayers. "I lived a
few days and nights in blinding pain," Angelou writes,
not so much toying with as seriously considering the idea of jumping
in the well, and Momma decided I had to be taken to a dentist. The
nearest Negro dentist was in Texarkana, twenty-five miles away,
and I was certain that I'd be dead long before we reached half the
distance. 8
Her grandmother decided, against custom, to take her to a
white dentist who lived in their town and to whom her grand-
mother had lent money during the Depression. Angelou de-
scribes bathing and putting on freshly starched and ironed
clothes, making the trek to the white side of town, and pro-
ceeding with her grandmother to the back door of Dr. Lincoln's
house. Dr. Lincoln, ignoring the little girl and her pain, refused
to treat her, saying "my policy is I don't treat colored peo-
ple."9 Angelou's grandmother pleaded with him and reminded
him that he owed her a favor. He replied, "My policy is I'd
rather stick my hand in a dog's mouth than in a nigger's.""°
During the 1970s, one elderly African American who was
born in Lawrence County, North Carolina, described to an
interviewer how the dearth of physicians available to African
Americans in the first half of the twentieth century affected
his family:
There wasn't too many colored doctors in the South. There was an
old one named Dr. James. When my brothers was bein' all that
sickly, all through the flu, you had to go 'bout ten miles to the little
town and get him. Then he'd be out on a call, and he'd come the
next day, or the day after. By the time he got there, everbody would
discrimination by Hill-Burton facilities are also discussed. Id. at 219, 252-54 (Hill-
Burton "allowed for 'equitable provision' to be made through separate but equal
hospital facilities."). The "separate but equal" provision of the Hill-Burton Act was
held unconstitutional in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959
(4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); see also PAUL STARR, THE SO-
CIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 350 (1982).
17 MAYA ANGELOU, I KNow WHY THE CAGED BIRD SINGS 157-60 (Bantam 1993)
(1969).
18 Id. at 157.
19 Id. at 160.
20 Id.
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be dead and you'd be goin' to the funeral.... Didn't have no family
doctors then, 'cause you couldn't afford it ... ."
The speaker does not even mention a visit to a white doctor as
a possibility.2
As Stevens suggests, "Formal desegregation of hospitals,
North and South, was not achieved until the middle and late
1960s, under the double force of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Medicare legislation of 1965."' Today, "informal"
practices of racial discrimination continue, and health facilities
remain, for the most part, segregated, largely on the basis of
economic status, which is highly correlated to race.' Physi-
cians, private hospitals and private nursing homes all insulate
themselves from the perceived burdens of serving patients who
do not offer high reimbursement or prestige." Indeed, it re-
21 WHEN I WAS COMIN' UP: AN ORAL HISTORY OF AGED BLACKS 158 (Olsen
Faulkner et al., eds., 1982).
22 See also Zora Neale Hurston, My Most Humiliating Jim Crow Experience, in
TRIALS, TRIBULATIONS, AND CELEBRATIONS: AFRICAN-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON
HEALTH, ILLNESS, AGING AND LOSS 23-24 (Marian Gray Secundy ed., 1992) (story
of discrimination by a white physician in the North).
2 STEVENS, supra note 14, at 50; see also DIETRICH C. RIETZES, NEGROES AND
MEDICINE (1958). Significantly, not until 1964, when the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), was the "separate but equal" provision of
the Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291e(f) (1958), held unconstitutional.
2 See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 14, at 50, 312; Hospital Keeps Private, Medic-
aid Patients Separate, Paper Reports, AP NATL DESK, Oct. 19, 1993 (reporting on
a series of five articles by Annette Fuentes, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 18-22, 1993) [here-
inafter Medicaid Patients]; Kevin Sack, Inquiry Finds Hospital Had Two Catego-
ries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1994, at 25.
Regarding the sociodemographic context for racial disparities, see generally,
Reed et al., supra note 2, at 1-5 (African Americans are more than three times
more likely to have incomes below the poverty level as whites); STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT, supra note 2, at 468 (Table 733) (Income Per Capita, by Race for States:
1989) (in 1989, per capita income for whites equalled $15,687; for Blacks, $8859;
for Hispanics, $8400) and 469 (Table 735) (Persons Below Poverty Level and Below
125 Percent of Poverty Level: 1959 to 1991) (in 1991, 11.3% of whites had incomes
below the poverty level, as compared to 32.7% of Blacks and 28.7% of Hispanics).
25 Higher percentages of African Americans under the age of 65 than whites
are either uninsured or insured through the Medicaid program. STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT, supra note 2, at 115 (Table 165) (Health Insurance Coverage Status, by
Selected Characteristics: 1985 to 1991), (Table 166) (Health Insurance Coverage, by
Selected Characteristic: 1987-89) & 116 (Table 167) (Persons Without Health Insur-
ance Coverage, by Selected Characteristic: 1989). For a discussion of the impact of
participating in the Medicaid program on the availability of services, see Robert
Pear, Low Medicaid Fees Seen as Depriving the Poor of Care, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
1991, at Al; Physician Payment Review Commission, Annual Report to Congress
1994]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
mains commonplace for medical practitioners to limit their
practices to privately insured patients. Low-income African
Americans who are able to obtain care from private practitio-
ners and private facilities often are relegated to separate wings
or provided with an inferior level of service.2 As Charles
Lawrence has written, "[Wihile formal, legally sanctioned seg-
regation was the chief form of stigmatization prior to Brown
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... the system has yet to be
dismantled, and other stigmatizing mechanisms... have rein-
forced its effects."27
In a meeting not long ago with tenants of a public housing
complex in New York, words heard by the author illustrated
both the experiences of the speakers and the utter alienation
so many people feel from the health care system:
Residents spoke of chaos in the emergency room of a not-for-profit
hospital located nearby: One woman, Mrs. C, knew a neighbor who
suffered with the effects of cancer and, yet, had lain in the emer-
gency room for days. He was told that there were no beds for him.
274 (1991) ("Medicaid directors were asked whether low physician participation
was a problem .... [Forty-four] states identified participation problems, and more
than half (twenty-seven) identified problems with both geographic and specialty
distribution of participating physicians."); see also Jane Perkins, Increasing Pro-
vider Participation in the Medicaid Program: Is There a Doctor in the House? 26
HOUS. L. REV. 77 (1989); Beth M. Yudkowsky et al., Pediatrician Participation in
Medicaid: 1978 to 1989, 85 PEDIATRICS 567 (1990) (between 1978 and 1989, the
proportions of both pediatricians who would not care for children on Medicaid and
those who placed quotas on their Medicaid patient load increased). Even in states
such as New York, where Medicaid reimbursements for inpatient care have been
set at the same level as those set by private insurers such as Blue Cross, practic-
es of exclusion and discrimination occur in the provision of both physicians' and
hospital services. Facilities cater to the practices of attending physicians and to
the perception that private pay patients would not want to share a room or corri-
dor with patients from different socioeconomic backgrounds.
26 See STEVENS, supra note 14, at 48-49, 112-13, 336; Yergan et al., supra note
11; see also Sack, supra note 24, at 25; Medicaid Patients, supra note 24, at 12.
' Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 351 & n.151 (1987). Derrick Bell
adds
IT]he Brown decision invalidated 'separate but equal,' replacing it-as
civil rights advocates urged-with 'equal opportunity.' But given the con-
tinued motivations for racism, the society has managed to discriminate
against blacks as effectively under the remedy as under the prior
law-more effectively really, because discrimination today is covert, hard-
er to prove, its ill effects easier to blame on its black victims.
DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
104 (1992).
[Vol. 60: 239
BREAKRNG THE BARRIERS OF ACCESS
Mrs. C. also knew a young girl who went to the emergency room ill;
after a wait, the girl was sent back home, where she died.
Residents spoke of racial and economic segregation at the local
not-for-profit: the hospital put the rich in one wing and the poor, in-
cluding people with Medicaid, in another. The hospital's staff treated
their two categories of patients differently. For example, the hospital
would not move poor patients out of the emergency room into beds
that were available in the "private" wing. Moreover, the conditions
in the private and public wings contrasted sharply. The public
wings, or poor people's wards, were "different worlds." Residents
spoke of inferior food and a lack of privacy. They had seen feces in
open areas. In the public ward, they stated, patients did not get
their beds changed as often or often enough. In the public ward,
patients did not get their medicine on time. A young father of four,
Mr. E., spoke about his stays in the public and private wings. In the
public ward, his IV bag would empty and no one would change it
until hours later. He watched other patients and learned how to
shut off the IV himself. If a patient were in pain and asked for
Tylenol, hospital staff would not give the patient the medication
and, instead, would say that he had to wait until the next morning.
In the private units, by contrast, appropriate medicines were listed
on the charts and patients were able to get pain killers right away.
Mr. S., who had also stayed on both wings, stated that physicians
had different attitudes in the private wing and that nurses there
provided more attention. Mr. S. stated that he felt badly when he
left his bed in the private unit, because on his way out he had
passed a number of poor people in need of beds-including someone
with appendicitis. He knew that there were beds for insured people
but not for the people he saw in the emergency room.
Simple lack of money was also an issue. As a result of a robbery,
Mr. S. had to have an eye operation. When he was ready to leave
the hospital, he found that the cost of the medicines that he was
supposed to take at home were $96 and $76. He could not afford
them. He asked if he could have some just for one day. Hospital staff
said that they didn't have any to give him. Other residents recalled
how they had been told to go to the public hospital if they wanted
free care. They recounted being told that they needed money to pay
for hospital services at outpatient clinics and even for emergency
room services. Mr. S. stated that when he did not have the $72 that
the hospital required to take out his stitches, he took the stitches
out himself.
Given this treatment at the private, not-for-profit hospitals,
why not go to the nearby municipal hospital? More than one resi-
dent recounted how they had heard of a person who had been "dis-
placed" there for a few days. They pointed out that the public hospi-
tal was understaffed and overcrowded.'
28 Meeting in Manhattan Residence Between Attorneys Retained in Mussington
1994]
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For at least the last fifteen years, many private facilities
have used specific, identifiable tactics to avoid treating poor
people of color altogether or limiting their numbers. Some of
these tactics are "structural"; that is, designed to or with the
effect of limiting access for the poor and, disproportionately,
people of color. Medical practices or facilities are set up, or
structured,2 so as to erect barriers to entry. Such actions pre-
clude the need for making further discriminatory determina-
tions to exclude people of color on an individual basis. These
structural decisions can sometimes be explained as motivated
on another basis, but exclusion or change in patient "mix" is at
least part of the reason for the action. ° For example, some
facilities relocate from African American or Latino communi-
ties to predominantly white, suburban communities.3' Other
v. St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital Center and Tenants of New York City Public
Housing (Aug. 27, 1991) (names were changed for reasons of confidentiality) [here-
inafter Meeting in Manhattan Residence]. See infra section IIIA. for a discussion
of Mussington v. St. Luke's Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., No. CIV.92-89618 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Dec. 11, 1992).
29 The word "structured", as used here, is specifically defined as concerned with
something built or arranged in a definite pattern of organization. See WEBSTER'S
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1154 (G. & C. Merriam Company 1977) (definitions
of "structural" and "structure").
30 Evidence of discriminatory intent is not required to prove racial discrimina-
tion pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, provided that discrimina-
tory impact is prohibited by agency regulations. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287, 293-94 (1985).
Although decisions to structure facilities in ways that limit access to poor
people of color are often intentional, the search for sufficient evidence to prove
this "intent" in court may be illusory. As one court stated, "[A] requirement that
the plaintiff prove discriminatory intent ... is often a burden that is impossible
to satisfy. '[IIntent, motive, and purpose are elusive subjective concepts.'" Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th
Cir. 1977) (quoting Hawkings v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir.
1972) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978)), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1025 (1978); see also Lawrence III, supra note 27, at 354-55 (advocating the
admission of proof of unconscious racism as evidence of intent).
"' Mitchell F. Rice, Inner-City Hospital Closures/Relocations: Race, Income Sta-
tus, and Legal Issues, 24 SOC. SCI. MED. 889 (1987); see Alan Sagar, The Closure
of Hospitals that Serve the Poor: Implications for Health Planning 2 (Apr. 30,
1982) (statement to the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment) (likelihood
of hospital closure is directly related to the percentage of African Americans in the
community) (on file with author); see also NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., 689
F.2d 1161, 1163-64 (3d Cir. 1982) (providing case history of civil rights lawsuit
challenging relocation of services); Terry v. Methodist Hosp. of Gary, Nos. H-76-
373 & H-77-154 (N.D. Ind. July 17, 1979) (consent decree).
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facilities close or move the typical paths of entry for poor peo-
ple-emergency rooms and obstetrical care units.32 The pri-
vatization of public and not-for-profit health facilities is anoth-
er technique for excluding the poor."3 And still other facilities
adopt restrictive hospital admissions policies, 4 limit the size
of their emergency room, or simply refuse to admit poor people
of color as a general practice, "dumping" lower income patients
on other facilities." One survey conducted in Chicago showed
that of patients transferred from emergency rooms at private
hospitals to the local public hospital, a grossly disproportionate
percentage were poor people of color.36 Private nursing homes
2 See, e.g., Mussington v. St. Luke's Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., No. CIV.92-89618
(S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 11, 1992) (complaint) (regarding closure of obstetric and pedi-
atric units), 824 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 18 F.3d 1033 (2d Cir. 1994),
discussed below.
' See Woodrow Jones & Patrick Clifford, The Privatization of Treatment Servic-
es for Alcohol Abusers: Effect on the Black Community, 82 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N
337 (1990); see also Cassandra Q. Butts, The Color of Money: Barriers to Access to
Private Health Care Facilities for African-Americans, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 159,
161-62 (1992).
34 See 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(d) (1993) (Hill-Burton community service regulations
that provide examples of admissions policies that may have the effect of excluding
persons on impermissible grounds, including, for example: (1) the practice of re-
stricting admissions to those patients who are referred by physicians with staff
privileges, if area residents of low income are unable to gain admission as a re-
sult; (2) the practice of restricting admissions to those patients who are referred
by physicians with staff privileges, if few or none of such physicians will treat
Medicaid patients and the effect is to exclude Medicaid patients from the facility
or from any service of the facility; (3) the practice of requiring an advance deposit
before admitting or serving patients, if the effect is to deny admission to some
persons or to cause them delay).
"5 See, e.g., Geraldine Dallek & Judith Waxman, "Patient Dumping" A Crisis in
Emergency Medical Care for the Indigent, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1413 (1986).
" Robert L. Schiff et al., Transfers to a Public Hospital: A Prospective Study of
467 Patients, 314 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 552 (1986); see also Equal Access to
Health Care: Patient Dumping, Thirty-Seventh Report by the Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Equal Access to Health Care: Pa-
tient Dumping, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergov-
ernmental Relations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Arthur Kellermann & Bela
Hackman, Patient 'Dumping' in Tennessee: An Analysis of Emergency Department
Transfers to the Regional Medicine Center at Memphis (Oct. 4, 1986) (preliminary
report submitted to the Board for Licensing Health Care Facilities, Tenn. Dep't of
Health & Env't) (revised Oct. 7, 1986); David A. Ansell & Robert L. Schiff, Patient
Dumping: Status, Implications, and Policy Recommendations, 257 JAMA 1500
(1987); Emily Friedman, Problems Plaguing Public Hospitals: Uninsured Patient
Transfers, Tight Funds, Mismanagement, and Misperception, 257 JAMA 1850
(1987); Larry S. Gage & Dennis P. Andrulis, Our Nation's Great Public Hospitals,
257 JAMA 1942 (1987).
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are particularly noteworthy for their exclusionary policies.
They properly have been described as the most segregated of
the country's publicly licensed health care facilities."
Lack of access to private and not-for-profit health care
facilities-hospitals, nursing homes and the offices of health
care practitioners-detrimentally affects the health of low-
income African Americans in a number of ways: first, by direct-
ly limiting medical services; second, by increasing feelings of
alienation; and third, by shifting the economic burden of treat-
ing the poor to often overcrowded and underfinanced clinics,
municipal hospitals and emergency rooms.8 Indeed, one ma-
37 See DAVID B. SMITH, DISCRIMINATION IN ACCESS TO NURSING HOMES IN
PENNSYLVANIA (1991). African Americans represent 23% of the elderly poor but
receive only 9% of the skilled nursing facilities care reimbursed by Medicaid. If
the provision of nursing home services reflected medical need, African Americans
would receive more, not less, care than whites. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMIERCE, 1989 Series P-60, No. 168 CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
CONSUMER INCOME: MONEY INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES
(Nov. 1990); HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN. ET AL., STATISTICAL REPORT ON
MEDICAL CARE: ELIGIBLES, RECIPIENTS, PAYMENTS, AND SERVICES, FY 90 (1991); see
also NEW YORK STATE DiV. OF HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., NEW YORK STATE NURSING
HOME TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT (1986); ROSSY-MILLAN, AN ANALYSIS OF THE
RELATION BETWEEN QUALITY OF CARE AND RACIAL SEGREGATION IN NEW YORK
CITY'S NURSING HOMES (1987).
Moreover, as indicated above, low-income African Americans who are able to
obtain care from private practitioners and private facilities are often relegated to
separate wings or provided with an inferior level of service. See, e.g., STEVENS,
supra note 14, at 48-49, 112-13, 336 (1989); Yergan et al., supra note 11.
" See Andrew B. Bindman et al., Consequences of Queuing for Care at a Pub-
lic Hospital Emergency Department, 266 JAMA 1091 (1991) (finding that long
queues for emergency care jeopardized the health of some patients); see also David
W. Baker et al., Patients Who Leave a Public Hospital Emergency Department
Without Being Seen by a Physician: Causes and Consequences, 266 JAMA 1085
(1991).
Significantly, the private health care system's neglect of the poor does not
simply narrow the available sources for care; it shifts the economic burden of
treating the uninsured and underinsured onto those clinics, public health facilities,
and private facilities that do leave their doors open-and these institutions can ill
afford the full weight of the economic burden. As a result, people using clinics and
public facilities experience longer waits, overcrowding, and staff and equipment
shortages. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF PUBLIC HOSPITALS, AMERICA'S SAFETY NET HOS-
PITALS: THE FOUNDATION OF OUR NATION'S HEALTH SYSTEM (1991); Dennis P.
Andrulis et al., Emergency Departments and Crowding in United States Teaching
Hospitals, 20 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 980 (1991); Lisa Belkin, Why Emergency
Rooms are on the Critical List, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, at E6; Howard W.
French, Harlem Hospital Overflows With Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1990, at B1
(as private hospitals try to cut services and costs, crowding intensifies at public
hospitals: "'Kids who were once seen at other hospitals are now coming to Har-
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jor reason why African Americans are in comparatively poor
health is that they cannot find health service providers that
will care for them.39
lem ... because they know we will treat them and give them medications wheth-
er or not they have insurance.").
See also STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 120 (Table 175) (Physician
Contacts, by Place of Contact and Selected Patient Characteristic: 1990); Reed et
al., supra note 2, at 113-39 (reporting that (a) only 52% of survey respondents
who are uninsured or on Medicaid cite a physician's office as their usual place of
care; (b) African Americans are more likely to be uninsured or on Medicaid; (c)
more than 20% of physician contacts made by African Americans occur in hospital
clinics or emergency rooms, compared to fewer than 12% by whites; (d) the aver-
age waiting time to see a physician is considerably longer for nonwhites than for
whites; and (e) the rate of dissatisfaction with care received reported by African
Americans is one and one-half to two times greater than the rate of dissatisfaction
reported by whites).
" See Reed et al., supra note 2, at 138; C. K. Riessman, The Use of Health
Services by the Poor, SOC. POLY, May/June 1974, at 41 (reporting that African
Americans and the poor underutilize medical services but that evidence suggests
increased utilization occurs when services are made available and structural barri-
ers are removed or minimized); see also Arthur B. Bindman et al., Public Hospital
Closes: The Impact on Patients' Access to Care and Health Status, 264 JAMA 2899
(1990) (finding that the closure of a public hospital had a significant effect on
access to care and was associated with a decline in health status); Arthur L.
Kellermann, Too Sick to Wait, 266 JAMA 1123 (1991).
The shortage of providers serving low-income communities of color is related,
in part, to the limited number of health professionals who are persons of color.
African American physicians, nurses and technicians tend to practice in medically
underserved communities but are in short supply, a situation that is but another
vestige of this country's history of discrimination and segregation. For a historical
perspective on the shortage, see W. Montague Cobb, Progress and Portents for the
Negro in Medicine, 55 CRISIS 107 (1948). For information and analysis of the low
numbers of minority health professionals, see HHS, Minorities & Women in the
Health Fields, HRSA-P-DV 90-3 at 17 (1990) (Table 3) (Estimated Active Supply of
Selected Health Personnel According to Race/Ethnicity, Latest Year Available); W.
Michael Byrd, The Black Physician: History and Current Issues (Apr. 5-7, 1990)
(address before the Black Health: Historical Perspectives and Current Problems
conference, Univ. of Wisconsin) (on file with author); W. Michael Byrd et al., Afri-
can-American Physicians' Views on Health Reform: Results of a Survey, 86 J. NAT'L
MED. ASS'N 191 (1994) (reporting that more than 90% of respondent physicians be-
lieved African Americans were discriminated against in the peer review process,
malpractice settlements, the grant of practice privileges at hospitals, hospital staff
promotions and in the referral practices of their white colleagues); Clint C. Wilson,
Minorities and the Medical Profession: A Historical Perspective and Analysis of
Current and Future Trends, 78 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N 177 (1986).
For discussion of the tendency of African American health professionals to
practice in medically underserved areas, see ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL
COLLEGES, MINORITY STUDENTS IN MEDICAL EDUCATION 16 (1988); David S. Guzick
& Rene I. Jahiel, Distribution of Private Practice Offices of Physicians with Speci-
fied Characteristics Among Urban Neighborhoods, 14 MED. CARE 469 (1976); see
also Stephen N. Keith et al., Effects of Affirmative Action in Medical Schools: A
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This situation is worsening. Since 1980, access to care has
actually declined for African Americans." This decline has
occurred in part because private facilities avoid treating Afri-
can American patients whom they perceive as potential reve-
nue losses.4' Moreover, many of these facilities have conclud-
ed that they can better compete for more affluent, white pa-
tients if their other patients are also white.42
II. THE ROLE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
So what can be done? Specifically, what roles can civil
rights advocates play on behalf of their clients to address in-
equalities in the provision of health services? Clearly, the time
has arrived for an overhaul of the health care system. During
the legislative process, Congress must address issues of access,
including how the President's Health Security Act and other
legislative proposals deal with the inadequate number of
health professionals and facilities that provide care in poor
areas, and what protection each measure offers against racial
discrimination. Advocates must find ways of helping their
clients play a role in shaping the law and, also, participate in
the process themselves.
Significantly, while a number of the proposals currently on
the table promise to bring about major improvements in the
nation's health delivery system, none would put an end to the
segregation, racial discrimination, or policies and practices of
exclusion that have characterized the provision of medical care
in the United States from its inception.43 As Derrick Bell cau-
Study of the Class of 1975, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1519 (1985).
"' See, e.g., Mark J. Schlesinger, Paying the Price: Medical Care, Minorities,
and the Newly Competitive Health Care System, 65 MILBANK Q. 270, 279 (Supp. II
1987); see also Gregory Pappas et al., The Increasing Disparity in Mortality Be-
tween Socioeconomic Groups in the United States, 1960 and 1986, 329 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 103 (1993); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Health Problems of Inner City Poor Reach
Crisis Point, N.Y. TIES, Dec. 24, 1990, at Al.
41 STEVENS, supra note 14, at 347; see also Laura M. Rosenthal, Health Cover-
age for the Uninsured: A Primer for Legal Services Advocates, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 1250, 1250-51 (1991); supra note 25 and accompanying text.
42 Schlesinger, supra note 40, at 270-76.
For a fuller discussion of issues that should be considered when evaluating
current proposals, see NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., Testimony
on the Health Security Act of 1992 (Nov. 16, 1993) (before the House Subcomm.
on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness of the Committee on
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tions us, we must acknowledge the fact that "racism is a per-
manent component of American life."' And, to the extent that
the reform packages retain divisions in the financing and de-
livery of services between the employed and the unemployed,
or between the employed and those on public assis-
tance--divisions that correspond to strata in our soci-
ety-advocacy, including litigation, targeted at structural
forms of discrimination will continue to be crucial.
Most generally, litigation can play a critical role in chal-
lenging practices that result in an unjust distribution of health
services. Ironically, the sheer number of laws on the books
suggest that poor people should already have adequate access
to health care facilities. Many of the exclusionary policies and
practices employed today are illegal and remediable. Indeed,
civil rights statutes and equal access laws expressly prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race45 and, in some cases, payor
status.46 These statutes place affirmative obligations on the
states not only to enforce civil rights laws but to ensure access
to health care for Medicaid participants.47 Unfortunately,
Energy and Commerce) (on file with author).
" BELL, supra note 27, at 13. Bell also writes, "We must acknowledge [the
permanence of racism,] not as a sign of submission, but as an act of ultimate
defiance." Id. at 12.
"5 See, e.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993), which guarantees the right "to
make and enforce contracts" on a nondiscriminatory basis. Section 1981 applies to
both public and private acts of discrimination, Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976), and, unlike Title VI, its application is not limited to recipients of federal
financial assistance. Section 1981 covers both racially based refusals to enter con-
tracts and discriminatory actions affecting the terms and conditions of contractual
relationships. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1988), as amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. Section 1981 claims may, thus, be
brought to challenge a wide range of discriminatory practices, such as refusals by
physicians to accept African American patients and segregation within health care
facilities.
" See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)(1) (1988) and 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(a), (c), (d)
(1993) for a description of the Hill-Burton Act community service obligation, which
prohibits Hill-Burton facilities from both discriminating against Medicaid and
Medicare participants and employing restrictive admissions practices that exclude
the poorer members of their communities. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988)
(anti-dumping provision).
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (1982). For a specific example of litigation
brought pursuant to these obligations, see Matthews v. Coye, C-90-3620-EFL (N.D.
Ca. 1991) (a discussion of the case is available in NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., INEQUITY IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH CARE: CLOS-
ING THE GAP 57-64 (1992) (on file with the author)).
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these statutes are not being enforced with any regularity, as
the federal government and the states routinely fail to take en-
forcement action. Fortunately, however, most of these statutes
permit private plaintiffs to bring lawsuits to challenge barriers
of access to services for the poor.4" It is part of the lawyer's
job to press for enforcement of the law and, where necessary,
to litigate.4"
Lawsuits have at least three interrelated purposes. First,
and, perhaps most importantly, as individual challenges to
discriminatory or exclusionary practices, lawsuits bring relief
to a plaintiff or group of plaintiffs.
Second, suits build a record of discriminatory and
exclusionary practices, a record that can be used by advocates
to educate the public and to support legislative and admin-
istrative change.5° This function requires lawyers to listen
48 See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582,
593-95 (1983) (private cause of action under Title VI); cf. Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992) (analysis of private right of action under
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which has developed along lines
similar to Title VI); Wilder v. Virginia Hasp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (implied
right of action to enforce requirements of Boren Amendment to Medicaid Act).
Despite the recent trend away from recognition of implied rights of action, see,
e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992) (no implied right of action for
private enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980),
the Supreme Court has left standing private rights of action under both Title VI
and the Boren Amendment, expressly choosing not to revisit its earlier decisions
as to these statutes. Id. at 1363-67; Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1031. But see Rand E.
Rosenblatt, The Courts, Health Care Reform, and the Reconstruction of American
Social Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POLy & LAW 439 (1993) (discussing erosion
of judicial rights enforcement role).
" Greater enforcement efforts are currently needed, for example, to end racial
discrimination by hospitals, nursing homes and health care practitioners, pursuant
to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982), among other
statutes; to enforce the community service obligation of the Hill-Burton Act, see 42
U.S.C. § 291c(e)(1), 42 C.F.R. § 124.601 (1993); to ensure that low-income African
Americans have access to appropriate emergency care, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
291c(e)(1), 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(b), and the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd; and to ensure that states are meeting their
current responsibilities to secure access to services for Medicaid participants, see,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A).
" As Cornel West has argued, legal work can play a significant role in educat-
ing the public on the fundamental principles and workings of our political arrange-
ments. Such legal work constitutes "one of few buffers against cultural conserva-
tism that recasts the law in its own racist . . . image"; it "helps keep alive memo-
ry traces left by past progressive movements of resistance"; and it serves "as a
basis for the next wave of radical action." Cornel West, The Role of Law in Pro-
gressive Politics, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1799-1800 (1990).
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carefully to their clients and, then, to use their legal skills to
make the stories public.5
Third, collectively, these suits constitute a direct assault
on the wall separating care for individuals of different racial or
ethnic backgrounds and different income levels. This third
point, in essence, suggests that enforcement of civil rights and
access-oriented laws will help to undermine the viability of the
current separation between the high-tech, quality care that
wealthy, middle-class and predominantly white America has
come to expect and the under-financed, inadequate and de-
layed health services so often provided to the poor and many
people of color. Such litigation will contribute to a more equita-
ble spread of the economic burden of serving the poor, thus
adding to the already mounting pressure for change.
This approach to litigation is, in a sense, a descendant and
an adaptation of the law reform model developed by Charles
Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall to challenge segre-
gation in the 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s. 2 These legal pio-
neers developed a record of cases that challenged unequal
conditions experienced by African Americans as violative of the
law, pursuant to the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson.3 By so doing, they sought to undermine the basis
for and legality of the prevailing doctrine. The strategy, togeth-
er with changing mores and societal pressure, forced the Su-
preme Court to address the fundamental inequity of segrega-
tion and to bring its interpretation of the Constitution in line
with a morality of human equality.
Unlike the effort that led to Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,54 however, the stream of litigation addressing inequality
in access to health care does not flow directly to the Supreme
" As with any job of translation, the role of an attorney in rendering griev-
ances and words into legal narrative is necessarily fraught with danger. For dis-
cussion of the role of the lawyer as translator in the context of criminal law, see
Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards
an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992). As James
Boyd White wrote in his review of Cunningham's article, "Translation is always
imperfect; but it is necessary that it be done." James B. White, Translation as a
Mode of Thought, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1388, 1397 (1992).
2 See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
' 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Court.55 Civil rights litigation in the health care area is de-
signed, instead, to enforce existing law and, thereby, to inform
and contribute to the movement for national health reform, not
only this year but in the future, as new financing and delivery
systems develop.56 The wall of separation between health care
for rich and poor, privately insured and uninsured, and white
and black, has been a bulwark against a tide of true reform, as
the poor and people of color lack political clout and the multi-
tiered system has insulated many middle-class whites from
sharing experiences of deprivation and denial.57
Litigation is only one of a number of approaches that must
be taken to close the gap. The attack must be coordinated and
multi-faceted, and it must include not only lawsuits, but legis-
lative work, public education and outreach efforts, community
action, and greater emphasis on the direct provision of care by
health professionals in low-income communities. Although the
recent judicial climate does not preclude the development and
implementation of an effective litigation strategy, litigators
must be cognizant of the increased importance of placing law-
suits in the context of multipronged advocacy. Litigation must
not displace community involvement but, instead, be a means
of community organizing and empowerment.
" But see Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking
Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987) (arguing for advocation of judicial
recognition of the rights of the poor, despite the currently unreceptive judicial
climate).
" Litigation can help to hasten necessary reforms even in the absence of a
national legislative overhaul of the financing and delivery of medical services.
Whether or not any of the current health care reform bills become law, specific
legislative and administrative actions must be taken to ensure access to care for
people with low incomes and, particularly, for low-income people of color. For ex-
ample, additional guidelines and regulations should be established to clarify areas
of ambiguity in existing laws, such as which agency has jurisdiction and responsi-
bility for reviewing major hospital construction projects for compliance with civil
rights laws. HHS regulations, for example, should explicitly delegate responsibility
for compliance reviews of hospital construction projects that receive federal mort-
gage guarantees.
" See Pear, supra note 25, at Al (reporting on difficulties faced by Medicaid
recipients, in contrast to Medicare recipients, that result from the lack of a broad-
ly based body of political support for the Medicaid program).
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III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BURDENS OF PROOF AND THE
EXPERIENCE OF DENIAL
This Part focuses on a key problem with which advocates
wrestle today, a problem that litigators challenging racial dis-
crimination under a new regime will face as well. Specifically,
advocates must find ways to span the gulf between the reali-
ties of denial experienced by the poor and recognition of such
harm, in law and fact, by courts."8 Since prior judicial find-
ings against plaintiffs who previously challenged barriers of
access quite obviously neither prevent nor nullify the very real
experiences of exclusion sustained by our clients, it is the
advocate's challenge to relate these experiences in a way that
will be more meaningful in the realm of the law.
At first blush, civil rights and other laws that protect
against racial discrimination and against the infringement of
rights of access would seem to prohibit the erection of structur-
al barriers to access. Legal standards under regulations pro-
mulgated pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
for example, explicitly prohibit denials of access and actions
with discriminatory effects,"9 as do the community service
" The gulf between what is experienced and what is acknowledged as proof is
much discussed in the context of the law of affirmative action. For example, Der-
rick Bell cites the Bakke decision, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), for its rigid application of rules in seemingly neutral ways that ignore real
facts. In Bakke, "[tihe Court introduced ... an artificial and inappropriate parity
in its reasoning-that is, that blacks and whites applying to medical school have
always been treated equally in a state that has never practiced racial discrimina-
tion-and thus chose to ignore historical patterns, contemporary statistics, and
flexible reasoning.'" BELL, supra note 27, at 102. Similarly, Patricia Williams de-
scribes the judicial decision-making in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989), as a "process by which the court consistently diminished the
importance of real facts and figures." PATRICIA K. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 106 (1991).
"9 Title VI states, in part,
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982). 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1992) provides: "A recipient . .
may not . . . utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color or national ori-
gin." (emphasis added). HHS regulations further state:
(b)(1) A recipient under any program to which this part applies may not,
directly or through contractual or other arrangements, on ground of race,
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regulations promulgated pursuant to the Hill-Burton Act.6"
Similarly, recent Supreme Court opinions have focused on the
impact of laws regulating abortion services in determining
whether these laws violate the judicially recognized right to
privacy under the due process clauses of the Constitution's
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the opinions
examine whether statutory provisions produce an "undue bur-
den" on the ability of women to obtain abortions.6'
Yet time and time again, courts have looked askance at
plaintiffs' challenges to denials of access and, specifically, at
evidence of how defendants' methods of structuring the provi-
sion of health care burdens the poor. The problem has arisen
in a number of contexts. This discussion will consider two:
color, or national origin:
(i) Deny an individual any service, financial aid, or other benefit
provided under the program ...
(b)(3) In determining the site or location of a facilities [sic], an applicant
or recipient may not make selections with the effect of excluding individu-
als from, denying the benefits of, or subjecting them to discrimination
under any programs to which this regulation applies, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin; or with the purpose or effect of defeating
or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of the Act
or this regulation.
45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (1992) (emphases added).
The community service regulations state, in part:
[A] facility shall make the services provided in the facility . . . available
to all persons residing . . . in the facility's service area without discrim-
ination on the ground of race, color, national origin, creed, or any other
ground unrelated to an individual's need for the service or the availabili-
ty of the needed service in the facility.
42 C.F.R. § 124.603(a)(1) (1993). This provision not only prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, color, or national origin, but also requires that facilities be
generally available to residents of the facility's service area. See Wyoming Hosp.
Ass'n v. Harris, 727 F.2d 936, 940 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Kenneth R. Wing,
The Community Service Obligation of Hill-Burton Health Facilities, 23 B.C. L. REV.
577, 600-10 (1982). The regulations further require that facilities "take any neces-
sary steps to insure that admission to and services of the facility are available to
beneficiaries of [Medicaid and Medicare] without discrimination or preference be-
cause they are beneficiaries of those programs," 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(c)(2) (1993),
and, perhaps most importantly, that "[a] facility is out of compliance . . . if it uses
an admission policy that has the effect of excluding persons on a ground other
than those permitted." 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(d) (emphasis added). Subsection (d)
lists illustrative examples of exclusionary admissions practices.
61 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2819 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ., announcing the judgment of the
Court).
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hospital relocation cases brought pursuant to Title VI, and
challenges to restrictions on the provision of abortion services,
restrictions that have particular effects on the ability of poor
women to access reproductive health services.62 In both con-
texts, the challenged actions place barriers of access in the
paths of the poor and burden their ability to obtain care. In
both, facial readings of the applicable legal standards suggest
that plaintiffs would be able to meet their burdens of proof.
But in each, the experience of the poor has been devalued.
Courts dismiss hardships faced by poor patients as (a) mere
inconveniences or slight alterations in the options available, to
be overcome by increased effort to obtain services on the part
of poor individuals;s or (b) issues of money, outside the pur-
view of the courts." In each case, court assessments
62 See id.; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
Compare Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 237 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding that the
closure of Sydenham Hospital would "affect a comparatively small number of per-
sons," that "adequate alternative treatment appears available for most, if not all,
of these persons," and that "any inconvenience due to travel changes in this case
do not rise to the level of harm necessary to enlist the equitable powers of [the]
court."), aft'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980) with Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 626-
28 (1980) (Kearse, J., dissenting) (discussing the potential impact of the closure
and concluding that defendants had "ignored major practical problems which
Sydenham's patients would encounter after a closure," including those resulting
from the patients' medical indigence and the failure of other, nearby hospitals to
accept uninsured patients). See also United States v. Bexar County Hosp. Dist.,
484 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Tex. 1980). After noting that "there will probably be some
inconvenience encountered" in arranging for transportation to the new site of ob-
stetric and nursery services, the court in Bexar minimized the issue:
When it is made clear to them that the best medical care possible in a
full service hospital, equipped to handle known and unanticipated compli-
cations, will be available to them and their newborn babies, . . . [the
plaintiffs] will have both the ability and good judgment to act in their
own best interest as well as that of their babies.
Id. at 859-60.
" See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 203 (while acknowledging, "[ilt would un-
doubtedly be easier for a woman seeking an abortion if she could receive infor-
mation about abortion from a Title X project," the Court rejected the claim that
prohibiting Title X clinics from providing such information was constitutionally
infirm: "The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy
the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of
governmental restrictions on access to abortion, but rather of her indigency.)
(quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)); see also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2819 (although regulations with an undue burden reach into the heart of the liber-
ty protected by the Due Process Clause, "[tihe fact that a law which serves a
valid purpose . . . has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more
expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it"). Note, howev-
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delegitimize or trivialize denials of access faced by the poor.65
In practice, judicial devaluation of the significance of barri-
ers of access can take a number of forms. First, courts "up the
ante", transforming a standard that requires proof of adverse
impact, or evidence that defendant's decision, action, policy or
practice "burdens" an activity, into a more stringent require-
ment, one that compels plaintiffs to demonstrate that they
were foreclosed or barred from access.66 While under the more
stringent test plaintiffs remain able to challenge some flagrant
forms of exclusion, the use of an "effective foreclosure" or "bar"
test rarely, if ever, allows plaintiffs to be successful on claims
against structural forms of discrimination. Second, courts look
dismissively at factual evidence of harm presented by plain-
tiffs, thereby ensuring that plaintiffs' proof will be deemed
insufficient to meet the requirement that plaintiffs show the
adversity or burden caused by defendant's action.67
A. Challenges to Discriminatory Hospital Relocations:
Mussington v. St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital Center
Mussington v. St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital Center5 was
filed in the Southern District of New York on behalf of commu-
nity residents to challenge the movement of obstetric, neonatal
intensive care, pediatric and other inpatient services out of the
Harlem area.69 In 1986, New York's St. Luke's Roosevelt Hos-
er, that the opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter leaves open the
possibility of judicial recognition of the burdens resulting from increases in ex-
pense. While the opinion recognizes no such showing on the record in Casey, the
opinion explicitly states that "at some point increased cost could become a sub-
stantial obstacle." Id. at 2833.
65 See BELL, supra note 27, at 111 ("Black people (while they may be able to
get into court) are denied such standing legitimacy in the world generally when
they discuss their negative experiences with racism."); see also WILLIAMS, supra,
note 58, at 55-58 (discussion and illustration of invisibility and devaluation). Bell
writes, "Isn't this the point of Invisible Man,... where Ralph Ellison depicts
blacks as a category of human beings whose suffering is so thoroughly ignored
that they, and it, might as well not exist?" BELL, supra note 27, at 155.
" See, e.g., Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 904 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (holding
that consolidation of hospital services would not effectively foreclose plaintiffs from
using those services).
61 See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
66 Mussington v. St. Luke's Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., No. CIV.92-89618 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Dec. 11, 1992) (complaint).
69 Id. In June 1993, Mussington was dismissed on procedural grounds. 824 F.
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pital Center had announced plans to transfer its maternal and
child care beds from a site near the medically underserved
communities of Central and West Harlem to the hospital's
downtown location, which serves a community that is less
populated, in larger proportion white, generally healthier and
of higher average income." The complaint alleged violations
of Title VI and the Hill-Burton Act. In many ways, this case
was a civil rights litigator's dream-lawyers represented com-
munity residents and groups that struggled on their own for
five years before attorneys appeared on the scene. Community
members fought in the political arena, held candlelight vigils,
and otherwise demonstrated their strong commitment to re-
taining services that are accessible to Harlem residents. The
client group had very clear ideas about how they were being
harmed. They felt that, given the high incidence of illness in
their communities and the shortage of providers,7' they could
not afford the loss of a single hospital bed, much less the loss
of the 300 or so-including all beds in the pediatric, obstetric
and neonatal intensive care units-that were slated for remov-
al from the Harlem area at the time.
Moreover, the mandates of statutory law were on
Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 18 F.3d 1033 (2d Cir. 1994). An investigation of
St. Luke's relocation of services by HHS's Office for Civil Rights continues, how-
ever. Community groups initiated the administrative procedure in 1991 by filing a
complaint that alleged civil rights violations.
7' See WEST SIDE/WEST HARLEM COMIUNITY HEALTH PLANNING COALITION,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH NEEDS IN WEST
HARLEM, MORNINGSIDE HEIGHTS AND MANHATTAN VALLEY 15-34 (Apr. 1989) (com-
paring indicators of socioeconomic and health status in the northern portion of the
hospital's service area, which includes Central and West Harlem, and the down-
town or southern portion).
71 Id. at 35 (finding that "[wihile pockets of need exist in the southern portion
of the [St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital Center] service area, the greatest need exists
in the northern portion"). Harlem and other neighborhoods near the hospital's
uptown site, for example, experience high infant mortality rates, high rates of
little or no prenatal care, high percentages of low birthweight babies, high teenage
pregnancy rates and high rates of deliveries by mothers who are substance abus-
ers or who suffer from chronic or acute illness. These factors create a greater need
for inpatient maternal and child care services that are accessible and that are
equipped to respond to high-risk pregnancies. Id. at 11; see also Christel Brelochs
et al., Building Primary Health Care in New York City Low-Income Communities,
1990 (Community Service Society 1990) (reporting on the low number of physicians
available to nine low-income communities in New York City); Colin McCord &
Harold P. Freeman, Excess Mortality in Harlem, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 173
(1990).
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plaintiffs' side, except that plaintiffs faced unfavorable prece-
dent set by a few past hospital relocation cases. Although the
precedent could easily be distinguished, its presence created an
imposing hurdle for this kind of litigation.7" Specifically,
courts in three cases, United States v. Bexar County Hospital
District,73 NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.,"' and
Bryan v. Koch,7' refused to enjoin the removal of services by
health care providers from African American and Latino to
white communities, despite strong evidence of discrimination
and, significantly for this discussion, evidence of the need for
those services in the communities of color, as well as of the
harm that would be caused by their departure.76 Despite im-
72 Not all hospital relocation and closure cases have ended in determinations
against plaintiffs. See, e.g., Heath v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 681 F.2d
814 (4th Cir. 1982); Terry v. Methodist Hosp. of Gary, Nos. H-76-373 and H-77-
154 (N.D. Ind.) (consent decree entered into on June 8, 1979).
Interestingly, Sydenham Hospital, the facility at issue in one of the cases in
which plaintiffs were denied relief, Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980), had been located only blocks away from St.
Luke's, the site that defendants in Mussington now plan to downsize. Indeed, in
the past two decades the Harlem area lost a number of facilities to policies that
called for bed reductions Manhattan-wide but allowed these reductions to occur
primarily in those poverty-stricken communities with the greatest need for health
care services and the least mobility. See Sara McLafferty, The Geographical Re-
structuring of Urban Hospitals: Spatial Dimensions of Corporate Strategy, 23 Soc.
SCI. MED. 1079 (1986) (study of hospital closures in New York).
Not only was Sydenham located near St. Luke's, but it also served a similar,
albeit smaller, patient population. Significantly, during the years since Bryan,
medical geographer Sara McLafferty analyzed the accuracy with which planners
had predicted changes in utilization that would result from the closure of Syden-
ham. Sara McLafferty, Predicting the Effect of Hospital Closure on Hospital Utili-
zation Patterns, 27 SOC. SC. MED. 255 (1988) [hereinafter Hospital Closure]. Con-
trary to claims made by St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital Center that patients would
easily travel from Northern Manhattan to their Roosevelt Division downtown,
McLafferty found that Sydenham patients moved to familiar nearby facilities rath-
er than distributing as had been forecasted. Specifically, fewer Sydenham patients
than expected had moved to hospitals located to the east or south. In fact, fewer
than expected had moved to Roosevelt. Id.
'3 484 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
' 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980), affd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
7 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
7 The posture and facts of each of these cases were unique. For example, in
NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") at
the U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare had already found the Medi-
cal Center's plan out of compliance with Title VI and had entered into a compli-
ance agreement with defendants. See NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 453
F. Supp. 280, 291-92 (D. Del. 1978) (Second Supplemental Report to Court Con-
cerning Investigation of Plan Omega with Respect to Alleged Title VI and Section
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pressive demonstrations of fact, the issue of harm was a stick-
ing point in these cases7 and as preparation for Mussington
began, plaintiffs' lawyers realized that they needed to reformu-
late how to prove that moving hospital services away from
those in greatest need-and away, not incidentally, from those
with the least mobility-would have adverse effects.78
The fact that the loss of beds would adversely effect Har-
lem residents in need of inpatient care was obvious to the
Mussington plaintiffs and other coalition members. For exam-
ple, community residents stressed how important time can be
to treatment.79 For a child with severe asthma or a seizure
that causes respiratory failure, a few minutes might affect his
or her chances for survival. Women in labor most often do not
have the time or ability to take a bus or ride a subway to the
hospital; and, for high-risk patients in labor, travel time by car
influences choice of facility and, in turn, has an impact on the
504 Violations). Plaintiffs' case attacked the Medical Center's plan as already mod-
ified by the agreement between OCR and defendants. Wilmington Med. Ctr., 657
F.2d. at 1325-26. In Bryan, plaintiffs challenged the City of New York's plan to
close Sydenham Hospital, a small facility in Harlem. Both Judge Sofaer and the
Second Circuit panel took into consideration the factual circumstances surrounding
the hospital closure, the most important of which were the city's horrific financial
condition at the time and the fact that Sydenham was an obsolete facility. In
their decisions, both courts relied on the finding that the city based its decision to
close Sydenham upon four sets of criteria that were reasonably related to the
efficient operation of the city's hospital system. Bryan, 627 F.2d at 618.
In addition, all three of these cases preceded Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983), in which the Supreme Court made
clear that Title VI can reach unintentional forms of discrimination that have
disparate effects, as well as deliberate discrimination. Id. at 593 (opinion of White,
J., joined in his conclusion by Stevens, Brennan, Blackman and Marshall, JJ.); see
also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1985). Plaintiffs need not provide
evidence that health care defendants intentionally discriminated in actions to en-
join practices with disproportionate impact on members of one or more minority
group, Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607. Proof of intentional discrimination, however,
may be necessary to obtain monetary damages. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984); but see Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs.,
112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992) (damages remedy available for an action brought to enforce
parallel statute, Title IX).
" See, e.g., Wilmington Med. Ctr., 657 F.2d at 1332 ("all of us are not com-
pletely persuaded that plaintiffs met their burden [of proving disparate impact]
here."); Bexar, 484 F. Supp. at 859-60.
"8 The task of proving the other prong of the prima facie case under Title VI,
disproportionality-i.e. that adverse effects will be felt disproportionately on the
basis of race, color or national origin-is analytically distinct.
" Meeting in Manhattan Residence, supra note 28.
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likelihood of delivering healthy babies. Area residents spoke
about how location affects accessibility-greater distances not
only increase travel time, but also the cost of transportation."
Currently, for example, at least one local tenants' association
keeps a few dollars on hand in case of emergency. If a resident
needs to take a cab to the nearest hospital, people lend or
donate the necessary four to six dollars. The supply of money
is based on contributions from low-income tenants and is
limited.
Moreover, residents had particular concerns about the loss
of pediatric beds.8 When children are in the hospital, their
parents need to make frequent visits. How, the residents
asked, can people visit their children, keep their jobs and
watch their other children if travel time and expenses are
increased? 2 Parents already borrow money to cover the costs
of transportation and babysitting. The farther the hospital, the
more resistent parents become to bringing their children to the
hospital, even though there are few, if any, alternative sources
of health care.
Community members became impassioned when discuss-
ing the extent to which Harlem is so grossly underserved and,
also, how the area had already lost approximately ten hospi-
tals. They felt strongly that St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital Cen-
ter was moving services in order both to reduce the number of
African American and Latino patients and to try to attract
more middle-class whites.83
In fact, studies in medical geography conducted in the past
two decades confirm what the clients knew: the loss of beds
would limit access and change patterns of hospital use, with
harmful effect." Research has shown that proximity, familiar-
80 Meeting in Manhattan Residence, supra note 28.
81 Meeting in Manhattan Residence, supra note 28.
82 Meeting in Manhattan Residence, supra note 28.
Meeting in Manhattan Residence, supra note 28.
4 Indeed, the merits of regionalizing highly technological and expensive health
services should not obscure either the significance of decisions as to where regional
facilities should be located or the desirability of making such facilities accessible to
all. See Sara McLafferty & Daniel Broe, Patient Outcomes and Regional Planning
of Coronary Care Services: A Location-Allocation Approach, 30 Soc. SC. MED. 297
(1990). Moreover, without taking exception to the desirability of the recent empha-
sis on preventive care, see, e.g., James F. Fries et al., Reducing Health Care Costs
by Reducing the Need and Demand for Medical Services, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED.
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ity, and socioeconomic and cultural factors are determinants of
access, as evidenced by hospital utilization. 5
321 (1993), it must be conceded that the accessibility of inpatient care makes a
difference. For an entry into the extensive literature on the relationship between
the availability of tertiary care facilities and birth outcomes, see, e.g., Cynthia J.
Berg et al., Neonatal Mortality in Normal Birth Weight Babies: Does the Level of
Hospital Care Make a Difference?, 161 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 86
(1989); Kwang-Sun Lee et al., Neonatal Mortality: An Analysis of the Recent Im-
provement in the United States, 70 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 15, 19 (1980) (noting the
impact of neonatal intensive care in lowering birth-weight-specific mortality); Lula
0. Lubchenco et al., Outcome of Very-Low-Birth Weight Infants: Does Antepartum
Versus Neonatal Referral Have a Better Impact on Mortality, Morbidity, or Long-
Term Outcome?, 160 A. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 539 (1989); Nigel Paneth
et al., Newborn Intensive Care and Neonatal Mortality in Low-Birth Weight In-
fants: A Population Study, 307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 149 (1982).
Officials at other health care facilities serving Northern Manhattan also
warned that the loss of beds near Harlem would limit access to St. Luke's Roose-
velt Hospital Center and shift patients to the public hospitals, with adverse conse-
quences. See, e.g., Letter from Edward B. Healton, M.D., Medical Director, Harlem
Hospital, and Stanford A. Roman, Jr., M.D., Senior Vice President, Medical &
Professional Affairs, New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation, to Robert
Gumbs, Executive Director, New York City Health Systems Agency (Mar. 29, 1990)
(stating that "there is a severe problem of overcrowding in the [neonatal intensive
care] units" in Northern Manhattan, that the location of obstetric and neonatal
beds is not irrelevant to the issue of access, that the movement of beds downtown
would shift patients-and, particularly, higher risk patients-to Harlem Hospital,
and that Harlem Hospital would be unable to meet the increased demand) (on file
with author); Letter from Margaret Grossi, M.D., MPH, Acting Commissioner of
Health, New York City Department of Health, to David Axelrod, M.D., New York
State Commissioner of Health (Mar. 29, 1990) (expressing concern about the move-
ment of maternal and neonatal health services and its effect on accessibility and
delivery of services) (on file with author).
' See, e.g., Rashid L. Bashshur et al., Some Econological Differentials in the
Use of Medical Services, 6 HEALTH SERv. REs. 61, 75 (1971); Wilbert M. Gesler &
Melinda S. Meade, Locational and Population Factors in Health Care-Seeking Be-
havior in Savannah, Georgia, 23 HEALTH SERv. REs. 443, 444, 456-59 (1988) (dis-
tance from home to regular source of care was a relatively more important factor
for inner-city residents than for suburban residents; proximity to daily activity
areas is a significant determinant for the poor, whereas more mobile suburbanites,
who are accustomed to traveling relatively long distances for work or shopping,
can incorporate a stop for health services into their routine trips); Marjorie A.
McGuirk & Frank W. Porell, Spatial Patterns of Hospital Utilization: The Impact
of Distance and Time, 21 INQUIRY 84 (1984); McLafferty, Hospital Closure, supra
note 72, at 255 (study of utilization patterns after closure of Sydenhamn Hospital
in New York); Klaus J. Roghman & Thomas R. Zastowny, Proximity as a Factor
in the Selection of Health Care Providers, 130 SOC. SCI. MED. 61, 68 (1979) (dis-
tance and prior experience are predictors of utilization); Gary W. Shannon et al.,
Time and Distance: The Journey for Medical Care, 3 INT'L J. HEALTH SERV. 237,
243 (1983) (the inner-city poor expend more time in the journey for health care,
though going shorter distances, and are, thus, at a disadvantage when seeking
care); Gary W. Shannon et al., The Search for Medical Care: An Exploration of
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The primary obstacle we, as lawyers, face in hospital relo-
cation and closure cases is no longer the adoption of appropri-
ate statutory language, the promulgation of regulations to
prohibit actions with disparate effects, nor judicial recognition
of such standards. Applicable anti-discrimination provisions
now clearly require demonstrations of disparate effects and not
evidence of discriminatory intent." Today, however, we must
confront the mismatch between the experiences of our clients,
who must contend with barriers of access, and the unwilling-
ness of courts to acknowledge these experiences and to accord
them weight.8 7 When a facility moves away from an African
American or Latino community, particularly one with a high
demand for medical services, thereby curtailing access, advo-
cates must find ways of proving the element of harm to the
courts, and, thus, of demonstrating the discriminatory nature
of the action.
B. Challenges to Restrictions on the Provision of Abortion
Services: Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey
The challenge is similar for advocates representing low-
income women of color in suits against restrictions on access to
abortion services. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,8" the Supreme Court affirmed the con-
Urban Black Behavior, 8 INT'L J. HEALTH SERV. 519, 530 (1978) (the spatial distri-
bution of medical care is an important determinant of utilization; and few if any
members of lower- or middle-class, African American communities studied access
suburban medical care).
" For pre-Guardians cases and analyses discussing issues that have since been
resolved, at least in part, see, e.g., Bryan v. Koch 627 F.2d 612, 616 (2d Cir. 1980)
(discussing arguments for and against application of the intent standard to claims
pursuant to Title VI); see also Marilyn G. Rose, Can Hospital Relocations and
Closures Be Stopped Through the Legal System? 18 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 551, 557-
58 (stating, "dicta in two more recent Supreme Court cases cast a shadow over
the discriminatory impact doctrine under Title VI"); Valerie A. Seiling, Note, The
Prima Facie Case and Remedies in Title VI Hospital Relocation Cases, 65 CORNELL
L. REV. 689 (1980); Richard J. Zall, Note, Maintaining Health Care in the Inner
City: Title VI and Hospital Relocations, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 271 (1980).
' Judicial recognition of the harms caused by hospital relocations, for example,
is necessary both for establishing plaintiffs' prima facie case of discrimination
under Title VI and for prevailing on a motion for preliminary injunction in such
cases.
8 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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stitutionality of a provision of the Pennsylvania Abortion Con-
trol Act that imposed a 24-hour waiting period before the per-
formance of an abortion. 9 The joint opinion by Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter states clearly, "A finding of
undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a non-
viable fetus."' Despite evidence before the Court that the
waiting period and other restrictions would actively interfere
with the ability of poor women to obtain abortions,9 the
Court, with little discussion and seemingly little consideration,
concluded that these provisions were not substantial obstacles
to obtaining an abortion. 2
It is clear that the 24-hour waiting period, for example,
will significantly increase the costs and accessibility of abor-
"' The Court upheld the informed consent provision, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3205(a) (Supp. 1994), and the mandated parental consent provision, 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (Supp. 1994). However, the Court struck the Act's re-
quirement of spousal notification, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (Supp. 1994).
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2831.
" Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
9' See Amici Curiae Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., and Other Organizations, in Support of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (Nos. 91-744, 91-902) [hereinafter LDF
Briefl; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association ("APA") in Sup-
port of Petitioners, 505 U.S. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (Nos. 91-744, 91-902) [hereinafter
APA Briefl.
Admittedly, evidence before the Court that the Act's provisions constituted an
undue burden was not fully developed, since plaintiffs had prepared their case
below to trigger the strict scrutiny standard of review, the prevailing standard
before the Court delivered the Casey decision. On remand, plaintiffs moved to re-
open the record to allow the introduction of new evidence to satisfy the undue
burden standard. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion, 822 F. Supp. 227
(S.D. Pa. 1993), but was reversed on review by the Third Circuit. 14 F.3d 848 (3d
Cir. 1994), application for stay denied, 114 S. Ct. 909 (1994).
92 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824, 2826. The finality of the Court's conclusions was
subject to doubt until recently. Upon remand, the district court granted plaintiffs'
motion to re-open the record in order to allow additional evidence that the chal-
lenged provisions constitute an undue burden, finding that although the Supreme
Court had ruled on the constitutionality of the Act's provisions on the record be-
fore it, the Court's decision did not preclude an evaluation of constitutionality
based on supplementary evidence. 822 F. Supp. 227, 233 (E.D. Pa. 1993). The
Third Circuit reversed, specifically finding that "[t]he language of the Supreme
Court's opinion makes clear that the Court applied the new standard and decided
the merits." 14 F.3d 848, 857 (3d Cir. 1994); application for stay denied, 114 S.
Ct. 909 (1994) (Souter, J.).
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tions for poor women because of the limited availability of
abortion services.93 As one brief for amici curiae suggested:
For poor women, it is already more difficult to find the necessary
financial resources, medical information, child care and time away
from work. The additional delay imposed by the 24-hour waiting
period-exacerbated by the likelihood of scheduling difficulties at
overcrowded facilities at which poor women receive care, as well as
barriers of distance and mobility-will actively interfere with the
ability of poor women and women of color to obtain abortions."'
Again, the problem is less the standard, if one takes it at face
value, and more the mismatch between the actual hardships
faced by the poor as a result of restrictions on the provision of
services and what is accepted as proof by courts, which have a
tendency to dismiss the particular experiences of low-income
people of color. 5
" See M. Lupfer & B. Goldfarb Silber, How Patients View Mandatory Waiting
Periods for Abortion, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 75 (1981) (finding that a waiting peri-
od of two days increased the costs of abortion for low-income women by approxi-
mately 48% and for higher income women by 14%); see also National Abortion
Federation & American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Who Will Provide
Abortions?: Ensuring the Availability of Qualified Practitioners (Oct. 25-26, 1990)
(recommendations from a National Symposium: Santa Barbara, Cal.) (discussing
the shortage of physicians willing to provide abortions); Amici Curiae Brief of the
American Public Health Association et al., in Support of Appellees at 22-23, Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (stating that as many as
21% of metropolitan areas and 91% of nonmetropolitan areas lack abortion provid-
ers, that "once a provider is located, transportation may be difficult to arrange or
afford," and that scheduling and communications may become problems, and con-
cluding, "Thus, by imposing increased cost and delay upon a woman seeking abor-
tion, the state forces her into a situation where her ability to obtain a safe abor-
tion is dramatically reduced.") (citing Stanley K. Henshaw et al., Abortion Services
in the United States, 1984 and 1985, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 63 (1987); Stanley K.
Henshaw, Reducing Teenage Childbearing, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 619 (1988)).
" LDF Brief, supra note 91, at 20 (footnote omitted). In support of the position
that the waiting period severely burdens a woman's right to choose, the APA stat-
ed that:
In many geographic areas of the country, women live long distances, even
hundreds of miles, from the nearest abortion provider. Research has
shown that the greater the distance from a provider, the less likely a
woman is to gain access to the abortion service. The lack of local services
can result in numerous difficulties for women seeking an abortion: travel
expenses, overnight lodging, loss of pay, and jeopardized privacy because
of absence from work and/or home for a significant period of time....
To add a 24-hour mandatory waiting period will impose an excessive
burden on many women, and for some women may prevent them from
receiving an abortion.
APA Brief, supra note 91, at 28-29 (footnote omitted).
"5 For a recent report on the difficulties faced by women seeking abortion ser-
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CONCLUSIONS
What conclusions can be drawn from these examples?
First, we must acknowledge that courts are not applying im-
pact-oriented standards in a neutral way. Perhaps such stan-
dards were not meant to pertain to the experiences of depriva-
tion felt by poor people of color. Perhaps, simply put, judges
administer or apply the standards in a biased manner, wheth-
er conscious or unconscious of the bias. 6 As advocates, we
must, nevertheless, find ways of demonstrating the harm in
fact and of highlighting, in Cornel West's words, "the legal
system's internal contradictions and blatant hypocrisy, using
the very ideals-fairness, protection, formal equality-it her-
vices, see Tamar Lewin, Hurdles Increase for Many Women Seeking Abortions, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 15, 1992, § 1, at 1.
See generally BRUCE WRIGHT, BLACK ROBES, WHITE JUSTICE (1987) (describ-
ing how racism permeates the legal profession and the administration of justice).
In analyzing the gulf between actual experience and the prevailing mode of judi-
cial analysis of such facts, some legal scholars have suggested that the courts'
failure to recognize the reality of hardship may be due to the distinct life experi-
ences of judges and, also, to cultural, unconscious racism. See, e.g., Jerome
McCristal Culp, Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understand-
ing, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 4142, 58-62 (discussing the delusion of neutrality held by
some whites in the judiciary and stating that "[mlost legal scholars, judges, and
law students do not know that they approach the question of law from a perspec-
tive that excludes black concerns"). Unconscious racism is discussed at length in
Lawrence III, supra note 27, at 322, 329-44. Lawrence writes,
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which
racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared
experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs
that attach significance to an individual's race and induce negative feel-
ings and opinions about nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural belief
system has influenced all of us, we are all racists.
Id. at 322 (footnote omitted); see also John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory,
Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a
Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2144 (1992) ("Although the world of
black Americans since slavery has been an integral part of American society, the
worlds of blacks and whites have been intensely separate. . . .It is, therefore, no
surprise that blacks and whites so often see quite different realities at both the
perceptual and experiential levels."); Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does
Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
302, 316-18 (1987) (discussing "Theories of Race and Racism"); A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr., The Bicentennial of the Constitution: From a Racial Perspective
11 (Nov. 12, 1987) (remarks at Association of the Bar of the City of New York
asserting relevance of racial perspective and sense of identification for interpreta-
tion of the Constitution).
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alds."97 We must build on our evidentiary base and make
our case with greater force.
To be more effective in demonstrating harm, we need to
consider strengthening relationships with social scientists
working in such fields as health planning and epidemiology."
For instance, although current medical geography literature is
relevant to the hospital relocation issue, much could be done to
demonstrate more conclusively the impact of moving services
and, specifically, the effect of relocations and closures on utili-
zation. First, medical geographers and health planners might
be able to assist one another in developing a sound
methodology for determining where inpatient beds and outpa-
tient services are needed, one that takes into account both
medical need, i.e., the incidence of illness in the population,
and utilization patterns.9 Experts could then apply the meth-
odology and present their findings in court. Such testimony
might provide: (a) a sound means of assessing the legitimacy of
defendants' claims that medical need justified the relocation or
closure of services; (b) a measure for determining whether
defendants' action represented the least discriminatory alter-
native; and (c) an additional indicator of the impact of the
movement or closure of services on the ability of a population
to obtain needed medical care.
Second, advocates might consider using the results of sur-
W7 est, supra note 50, at 1802.
'8 In the late 1980s, for example, a number of civil rights and poverty law
organizations coalesced to initiate an effort to cooperate on the promotion of schol-
arship on questions of race and poverty and to form ongoing, if informal, relation-
ships with researchers. By establishing the Poverty & Race Research Action Coun-
cil ("PRRAC"), the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., the Center for
Law and Social Policy, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Georgia Legal
Services Program, the National Housing Law Project, and the Children's Defense
Fund, among other groups, hoped to create a climate for better communications
with researchers whose fields touch on issues of access, opportunity and equity in
the provision of health care, housing, education and other key areas. PRRAC
strives to generate productive interaction between advocates and researchers
through dialogue; for example, it convenes periodic conferences and publishes a
newsletter. PRRAC also funds specific research projects that are considered to be
both solid methodologically and of interest to advocates.
" In a number of states, utilization data is available that can provide re-
searchers with information on the composition of patients in a given facility by
race, gender, age and insurance type, as well as by methods of admission, zip
codes of residence and categories of services rendered. New York State's 'SPARCS"
data is but one example.
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veys and in-depth interviews to supplement current informa-
tion on hospital utilization. While statistical analyses of the
impact of relocating or closing services on patterns of utiliza-
tion can demonstrate where patients are treated after the
movement or closure of beds, the numbers fail to explain ade-
quately the causes of the impact.' The statistical studies,
and the expert witnesses who testify to their results, leave
courts wondering why patients so often do not go for treatment
to the suburbs or to the gentrified areas of town that now
house new or modernized facilities. Of course, plaintiffs and
area residents do testify about the impact of a relocation or
closure on their ability to obtain timely and appropriate care.
This testimony can be crucial, but may also be dismissed by
courts as anecdotal or amounting only to demonstration of
inconvenience for a few select members of the population.'0 '
Expert testimony on this issue may lend support for plaintiffs'
statements, diminishing the possibility that courts will dis-
count them as idiosyncratic or unrepresentative, and can help
to refute defendants' claims that patients will, in fact, follow
the beds. Surveys and in-depth interviews of community mem-
bers might, thus, help to fill the gap.'12 One such study of
women of childbearing age in low socioeconomic neighborhoods
in the vicinity of the uptown site of St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospi-
tal Center, for example, found that no more than 34% of those
surveyed-no more than 34% of a sample that was
sociodemographically representative of women who would
otherwise use the uptown site, the location situated near Har-
lem-could be expected to seek obstetric care downtown once
" See McLafferty, supra note 72 (statistical study of changes in utilization that
distinguishes between predictive model and analysis of causative factors).
1.. See United States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855, 859-60 (W.D. Tex.
1980) (discounting plaintiffs' claims of inaccessibility and acknowledging the testi-
mony of private plaintiffs not for its substance but, instead, to rationalize the
court's judgment: the opinion stated 'that after having closely observed the de-
meanor of the private plaintiffs, and their ability to respond to questions while
testifying," the court believed that they had "the intelligence and judgment" to
travel to the new facilities to deliver their newborns).
1 Both surveys and in-depth interview techniques are means to explore rela-
tionships and to develop causative models. See ROBERT E. LANE, POLITICAL IDEO-
LOGY (1962) (groundbreaking work that used intensive, individual interviews to
explore political beliefs); see also JENNIFER L. HOCHScHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN
DILEMMA (1984) (more recent study of attitudes and behavior around issues of
integration and education based on analysis of surveys and individual interviews).
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services were moved. 1 3 This study was also able to identify
factors, such as distance to care and past experience, that
appeared to influence the population's health care seeking
behavior.'
And while there are already tremendous efforts to gather
materials on the use of family planning and abortion services
and the impact of regulations on the provision of abortions,
generally,0 5 advocates must ensure that research focuses on
the particular impact on low-income women of color. Where do
women in poor counties and in rural and urban areas go for
services? How do low-income women of color travel to provid-
ers? How do parental consent provisions affect the choices of
adolescents from low-income families?0 6 How do such provi-
sions affect their rates of utilization? How do mandatory wait-
ing periods affect the choices of low-income women of color?"0 7
And what has been the impact of past state restrictions on
utilization by low-income women of color?10 8 In order to dem-
onstrate the undue burden that restrictions place on our cli-
ents, we must present relevant anecdotal evidence in court
" Luis Gomez, Hospital Relocation and Health Care-Seeking Behavior Patterns
of Inner-City Poor 33, 42 (1992) (unpublished thesis, Mount Sinai School of Medi-
cine, New York) (reporting on a series of structured interviews with a sample of
women of childbearing age that investigated factors appearing to influence
respondents' past and planned health care seeking patterns) (on file with author).
'o Id. at 42.
100 See, e.g., publications of the Alan Guttmacher Institute.
106 Generally, parental consent provisions increase delay, cost and, ultimately,
the health risk of abortions. See ACLU REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM PROJECT, PAREN-
TAL NOTIFICATION LAWS: THEIR CATASTROPHIC IMPACT ON TEENAGERS' RIGHT To
ABORTION 15 (1986); O'Keefe & Jones, Easing Restrictions on Minors' Abortions
Rights, ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 74, 78 (1990). Less is known about how such provi-
sions impact the poor and teenagers in low-income communities of color, in partic-
ular.
, The harmful effect of delay on health outcomes for women who ultimately
receive an abortion has long been clear. See, e.g., Willard Cates et al., The Effect
of Delay and Method Choice on the Risk of Abortion Morbidity, 9 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 266 (1977). For an example of the kind of research that would begin to
clarify the particular impact of waiting periods on low-income women of color, see
generally Lupfer & Goldfarb Silber, supra note 93.
10" For examples of such research, see Willard Cates, Jr., The Hyde Amendment
in Action: How Did the Restriction of Federal Funds for Abortion Affect Low-In-
come Women?, 246 JAMA 1109 (1981); see also Benson Gold, After the Hyde
Amendment: Public Funding for Abortion in FY 1978, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 131
(1980); James D. Shelton et al., Abortion Litigation: Does Travel Distance Matter?,
8 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 260 (1976) (finding that distance is especially disadvanta-
geous to blacks and most so to black teenagers).
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and, also, must consult with researchers who can collect com-
prehensive data on the experiences of low-income women of
color and can study how particular regulations will impact
their ability to obtain services.
In anti-discrimination suits challenging hospital reloca-
tions and closures and in litigation against statutes that place
restrictions on the provision of abortion services, courts have a
duty to take seriously evidence of the ways in which structural
barriers preclude meaningful access to care for the poor. What-
ever the prospects for a fair hearing, however, we, as advo-
cates, must find the means to present our cases more effective-
ly. We must develop our proof to increase the probability of
prevailing on behalf of our clients and, also, to serve the broad-
er goals of litigation. Given the tremendous barriers of access
faced by low-income people of color, the pervasiveness of dis-
criminatory practices in the provision of health care, and the
less than successful judicial record in health care access cases
thus far, advocates must rethink strategies and conceive of
new approaches. We should, for example, augment our infor-
mation base and work with epidemiologists, other social sci-
entists, demographers and medical specialists to develop the
record. Then, with greater evidentiary power, we must build
our cases in the courts by relating the realities faced by our
clients.'
"' Critical legal theorists critique the concept of rights and often argue for a
dialogue that stresses human needs. See discussions of the debate over the rele-
vance of "rights" and 'needs" in WILLIAMS, supra note 58, at 146-65; Delgado, su-
pra note 96, at 303-07. The approach toward the presentation of evidence that is
outlined in this paper combines these two strategies, although some may see them
as diametrically opposed. As critical race theorists indicate, an explication of
needs, alone, will not be persuasive to those who do not identify with low-income
people of color. Patricia Williams writes, for example, "For blacks, describing
needs has been a dismal failure as a political activity." WILLIAMS, supra note 58,
at 151. This paper thus suggests continued use of the courts as one avenue in the
struggle to give meaning to rights, but proposes, perhaps paradoxically, that a
more persuasive depiction of needs is a necessary element of even this effort.
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